The use of medication remains the most common intervention in health care. The complexity of both medication use and the medication management process, especially in the in-patient setting, create a signiWcant risk for hospitalized patients. Despite the widespread recognition of the hazards that medication use poses to patients, there are no widely accepted or standardized methods to measure the safety of medication use. Where to focus measurement in medication safety is the subject of ongoing debate. Various groups have suggested measuring error-prone aspects of the medication use process such as errors in administration of medications or errors in dispensing of medications. Other groups have suggested measuring adverse drug events as a measure of the safety of medication use. Many studies in this area have outlined the great difWculty associated with getting clinicians to report either medication errors or adverse drug events voluntarily. In response to these challenges, yet more groups have developed non-voluntary reporting methods based on the use of 'triggers', in either a chart review or electronic format. Medication safety is a complex process and measurement of it needs to be a core component throughout the whole process. With the introduction of computerized analysis of patient information, measurement becomes much easier and potentially more powerful and achievable than either incident reporting or chart reviews for purposes of accountability, prevention, and ongoing improvement of both process and clinical practice. This paper reviews approaches to measuring medication safety from the perspective of both harm and error, and outlines a strategy that combines both approaches in the electronic era.
admissions, 30-58% of which were potentially preventable. Medication-related events were the largest single category of adverse events (19% of all adverse events in both studies). Similarly, research in Australia has suggested that ∼20% of all prospectively reported incidents and at least 10% of all adverse events detected through retrospective chart review are related to medications [5] .
Other more recent research employing computerized surveillance in place of chart review [6] or voluntary reporting [7] suggests that these Wgures are understated. New studies using trigger tools-speciWc combinations of events and patient Wndings-suggest that the actual incidence of adverse drug events (ADE) in hospital patients may be much higher [8] .
'Surveillance' is an appropriate term for measurement applied to medication safety because it suggests both the ongoing and investigative nature of the activity. We believe that a well coordinated and evolving program of automated surveillance will be a core element of the industry's quest for medication safety. Quite simply, measurement is critical to bringing a high degree of reliability to medication management.
A recent publication by Kilbridge and Classen [9] provides the rationale for surveillance, states the advantages and disadvantages of manual versus computerized approaches, and deWnes the structure and process of an organized surveillance program in the hospital setting. This paper is also about surveillance, with an emphasis on practical tactics. Efforts to measure medication safety in the past have been largely manual. What is needed is a more comprehensive way to pinpoint problems with medications for purposes of learning and improving the process, establishing accountability, and (eventually, when sufWcient clinical information is available in electronic form) preventing medicationrelated errors and ADEs whenever possible. The discussion below Wrst makes recommendations about what to measure and then reviews tactics for measurement.
What to measure: adverse events versus errors
One of the ongoing controversies in medication safety is how to measure the safety of the medication system reliably and how to assess the effect of interventions designed to improve the safety of medication use. Clearly, common nomenclature, deWnitions, and an overall taxonomy for medication safety are essential to this undertaking and the lack thereof has signiWcantly hampered the comparison of various medication safety interventions among different centers [10] . At the heart of an even more fundamental controversy is whether the focus of patient safety should be on medical errors or adverse events as a means of assessing and improving the safety of the health care system.
Errors are failures in the process of medical management, and they have the potential to harm the patient. Adverse events, in contrast, relate to actual harm: injury caused by medical management, rather than solely by the patient's underlying disease. Errors may or may not result in adverse events [9] . Medical errors and adverse events represent two different categories of events whose overlap-preventable adverse events-should clearly be the target of process and technology improvement efforts in the Weld of patient safety.
Most medical errors do not result in harm to patients; the safety net provided by current health care processes catches many of them, or they may reach the patient but never cause harm. This raises the question of whether the endpoint of quality improvement should be the measurable reduction of adverse events, or the reduction or complete elimination of medical errors per se? Some errors that do not result in injury may be of interest because they represent situations that might have lead to patient injury (near misses). However, the epidemiology of errors that cause harm to patients compared with those that do not cause harm is poorly characterized for most health care processes and therefore the use of reduction of errors as a proxy for reduction in harm is highly problematic.
Although many recent reports have focused great attention on medical errors, patient safety may also be approached by concentration on actual injury. Whereas the error-oriented approach includes mistakes that do not harm patients such as near misses, the injury-oriented approach includes harm to patients arising from a diagnostic or therapeutic procedure, including those that are not associated with an identiWable error [11] .
Because >70% of the injuries in the Harvard Medical Practice Study in Utah-Colorado were not the result of negligent care, the difference between medical injury and medical error is not just an issue of terminology, but often a practical issue of judgment on the part of the reviewer. The difWculty with a sole focus on errors is that consistent agreement on identiWcation of an error in care is typically not reproducible, either between centers or between trained reviewers. Thus, even detailed reviews of medical records by trained researchers that are focused on error identiWcation to improve patient safety will have limitations. This stems from the fact that there are no published methods for measuring medical injuries or system failures, and hence controversy surrounds the true error rate. By targeting only those injuries with clear evidence of error, any investigation of medical error has the potential to focus only on a relatively small subset of medical injuries [12] .
One model for studying adverse events has been to identify sentinel adverse events and then drill down to the root causes. Sentinel events committees, quality improvement efforts, and injury prevention models use root cause analysis to elucidate the causes of an adverse event. Although useful, root cause analysis is not sufWcient because it has no formal way of assessing the frequency of the relative contribution of these causes or errors. In addition, these queries tend to focus on sentinel or rare events that do not pertain to the most common types of the harm that occurs to patients. After a root cause analysis, there is often a long list of potential system Xaws, so long and complex in fact that it is difWcult to imagine how this method would assess the contributions of each of the identiWed contributory causes [12] .
Another approach, the injury prevention model, provides a coherent theoretical framework for addressing medical injuries comprehensively, including a systematic sequence of methods to identify medical injuries, study their causes, and intervene to reduce their occurrence or severity. A focus on medical injury avoids many of the operational difWculties and institutional and personal barriers posed by methods that focus on errors. Rather than culpability, it emphasizes prevention, which should be the ultimate goal of patient safety efforts. An important principle of the injury prevention model is the comprehensive focus on injuries, rather than on negligence, which avoids the pitfalls in determining negligence, error, or subjective judgments about preventability.
In efforts to improve patient safety, the injury prevention model with a focus on injury can provide a useful complement to those approaches that focus on error [12] . Indeed the Australian approach to measuring safety incorporates both approaches: a voluntary anonymous incident reporting system called AIMS (Australian Incident Management System), in which an incident is deWned as 'any event or circumstance which could have or did harm anyone or could result in a complaint' [5] , and a separate system called the Quality in Australia Health Care Study (QAHCS), which involves the non-voluntary retrospective analysis of medical records of hospital admissions, in which an adverse event is deWned as 'any event or circumstance caused by health care management rather than a disease process that resulted in admission to hospital, prolongation of hospital stay, morbidity at discharge, or death' [5] .
Goals of measurement
As hospitals tackle medication safety more aggressively, measuring safety will prove to be an essential tool in both understanding the problem and tracking success in solving identiWed problems. As more electronic patient data become available for analysis, the detailed insight gained by computerized analysis will add signiWcantly to information that can be gleaned through voluntary reporting and chart review. In designing programs that increasingly rely on both manual and electronic methods, it will be important to use them in a coordinated way to accomplish three separate but somewhat overlapping goals for measurement [8, 9] : to learn and improve, to ensure accountability, and to intervene.
To learn and improve. Each hospital must understand its own medication safety problems before it can focus on weak spots. The experience of other hospitals in the published literature provides clues about where to look, but this alone is not sufWcient. The many processes of medication management are so complex, and variations from one hospital to another so large, that it is always necessary to continually study and pinpoint local weak spots. Measurement using prospective surveillance and voluntary reporting both play an important role in providing information to learn and improve. Within a culture of safety, non-punitive voluntary reporting is the best way to identify new and unexpected hazards, and needs to be part of any medication safety program. Focusing on ADEs in voluntary reporting also focuses follow-up interventions on the highest impact strategies. Some ADEs, although not preventable today, may be preventable in the future when advances in pharmacogenetics make it possible, for example, to predict which patients will suffer an adverse reaction to a particular medication [13] .
To ensure accountability. Real progress is not demonstrated by the number of safety initiatives tackled, but rather by outcome data on targeted problems compared with baseline metrics. A reduction in actual ADEs-an indisputable measure of quality-tracked over time is the best way to show meaningful progress.
To intervene. Measurement through surveillance done in realtime can provide an additional safety net, to alert physicians and pharmacists in time to intervene. A basic principle in high-reliability industries like aviation is multiple layers of safeguards. Even when other safeguards such as clinical decision support tools in computerized physician order entry (CPOE) are in place, real-time surveillance can pick up situations otherwise missed or bypassed, such as a change in patient status. Thus, an ADE surveillance program with real-time alerts provides an important layer of redundancy over normal processes of assessing patient status and speeds up response to important new information. Supporting interventions in real-time requires moving beyond manual reporting to both electronic data analysis and automated tools for notiWcation. Tracking the occurrence and results of this intervention at the hospital level also provides important information for continued work addressing system safety Xaws.
As discussed below, electronic surveillance of ADEs can make a major contribution toward reaching these goals.
How to build an electronic measurement system for medication safety
We believe that measurement to improve medication safety requires four separate components (which mirror the underlying medication use process) as illustrated in Figure 1 .
Patient data collection
Virtually every hospital in the US has some patient information in electronic form. Once the available data are accessible for analysis (usually in a single database), possibilities are improved for a medication safety measurement program.
Analysis
Tools for screening patient data for possible problems can be as simple as standard reporting tools or as complex as rules in a decision support program that is applied in real time. Clinical triggers to identify potential ADEs are the combination of clinical circumstances suggestive of a problem (e.g. renal status or elevated serum drug levels) or speciWc medication orders (e.g. order for therapy for an interaction). When screening tools reXect the clinical triggers of interest, the second component (depicted in Figure 1 ) is in place. 
Reporting
When conditions or rules are met through screening, various means are available to report the information to interested parties. This can include batch reporting at pre-deWned intervals or real-time reporting via hard copy or screen display. More proactive reporting tools can send electronic messages or faxes, track lack of response to critical triggers and institute automated escalation procedures, and notify via other means such as pagers or telephone. Different program purposes are served by different sets of reporting capabilities.
Response
The human reaction to measurement information is the Wnal component of a measurement program.
With all of the capabilities of today's clinical systems to generate data, the rate-limiting factor is typically usable information derived from the data. As the scope and quantity of patient data grows, so do the opportunities for medication safety measurement. Likewise, the power of measurement to support the hospital-based patient safety program increases as the other information systems components move to enabling real-time detection and reporting of ADEs.
Measurement using pharmacy data
The pharmacy applications used in most US hospitals capture both patient demographic information (age, sex) and medication orders written for hospitalized patients entered by pharmacy staff. As shown in Figure 2 , the database accumulated is sufWcient to launch an early measurement program long before more advanced clinical systems such as CPOE add to the capabilities.
Tools for screening the database typically reside in the pharmacy software application, although it is also possible to download medication order information to a standard management reporting application. Triggers at this stage often include diphenhydramine (or benadryl), frequently used for allergic reactions, romazicon, used to reverse benzodiazepine drugs, naloxone, a powerful narcotic antagonist, inapsine/ zofran for patients also on theophylline preparations, Lomotil use in a patient receiving Clindamycin, or an abrupt stop of medications [7] .
Batch reports can provide useful insight into medication safety problems when they are thoroughly investigated, and the Wndings documented for further tabulation and analysis. Clearly not every situation Xagged by the triggers will turn out following investigation to be an ADE, but the added scope of computerized surveillance-all patients, all orders-can signiWcantly deepen the institutional knowledge about weak spots in patient assessment, documentation, order writing, etc., over what can be learned from voluntary reporting and chart reviews. With the information in hand, the Pharmacy and Therapeutics Committee, Medication Safety Committee, or other group charged with responsibility for medication safety can both deWne its improvement agenda and track progress over time. Knowledge gained may also be useful for enhancing or revising clinical decision support tools that assist pharmacists in detecting problems as they verify medication orders.
Measurement with pharmacy and laboratory information
The addition of laboratory data to pharmacy data adds signiWcantly to the opportunities for screening. As shown in Figure 3 , the original sources of information are typically pharmacy and laboratory applications. Although tools for cross-application analysis have been reported [14] , screening and analysis typically requires that patient-identiWable information on laboratory test results and current medication orders reside in a single database. This can be either a clinical data repository (CDR) or a side database speciWcally designed for ADE detection. The former solution is preferable, offering real-time screening as new patient information becomes available-an event or rules engine module, and today typically also a communication utility that can send real-time electronic alerts via message, auto-print, or pager. NotiWcation tools provide the ability to start detecting problems in time for intervention.
With both medication orders and laboratory test results for the same patient available for screening, triggers such as decrease in creatinine clearance in patients on nephrotoxic drugs or drug levels above normal for targeted medications are possible. When surveillance is set up for real-time analysis and notiWcation using these tools, physicians, responsible nurses on the patient's unit, and/or pharmacists can be notiWed in time to intervene with appropriate changes to orders. This can prevent or mitigate potential harm from orders that are Figure 2 Components of medication safety measurement: pharmacy data.
no longer appropriate for a given patient. As summarized in Table 1 , this combines an effort that focuses on detection for purposes of investigation and accountability with intervention to avoid or reduce harm.
Measurement with pharmacy, laboratory, and medication administration information
When electronic information concerning medication administration can be added to the mix, the possibilities are expanded further. As shown in Figure 4 , a CDR will normally be the database, although it is technically possible to pull information from a medication administration application into a side database. Most of the new triggers possible at this point, for example documented new skin rash in patients on Imipenem, or INR > 6 in a patient on coumadin with a falling hematocrit, lend themselves more to retrospective surveillance to understand the volume and nature of ADEs.
Medication safety measurement and real-time clinical decision support
As more advanced technology, such as CPOE with decision support, is placed in the hands of clinicians, the possibilities for catching and preventing potential medication-related errors at the ordering stage are greatly increased [15] . The role for surveillance with notiWcation remains important because it can alert clinicians to changes in patient status (i.e. renal function), requiring re-evaluation of medication orders when they are not using the system, and notify other members of the care team to follow up on the situation. Retrospective measurement is also important to measure progress to help establish an agenda for further improvement efforts. Table 2 summarizes the relative contributions at this stage.
The challenge for each hospital is to use its current tools wisely and to plan for tools that will become available at each step in the migration toward more advanced clinical systems. Today's pharmacy systems include an impressive array of clinical decision support tools for medication order checking. With these in place, hospitals need not wait for CPOE to apply this element of the information technology safety net. Some recent products are designed to check medication doses against original orders at the time of administration, although this may be potentially less efWcient because the pharmacy has already dispensed and delivered the medication called into question. However it does provide a redundant safety check at the time of administration.
Conclusions
The patient safety movement has arrived at a crucial crossroad. Will it continue to debate the merits of a sole focus on errors or injury (with no apparent resolution), or will it begin to 
Focused on intervention
Focused on detection Screens for problems as they are occurring Screens for negative outcomes of prescribing Delivers rules-based alerts based on screening of orders and new patient information Provides data for investigating potential ADE Can detect problems and speed investigation and response Provides evidence of progress, and targets for further improvement efforts focus its efforts on building safer and more reliable processes of care? A reasonable tactic involves demonstrating the improved safety of these processes with measurement approaches that rely on multiple sources of information that make both errors and injuries much more apparent and transparent, and also includes mechanisms for prevention, and recovery when an error or event has occurred.
The medication use process is an ideal model for demonstrating this new approach to measurement; medications are the most common intervention in health care and virtually all studies of safety of care have identiWed the medication use process as one of the greatest risk to patients. Unfortunately these same studies reveal an enormous under-detection bias for both medication errors and adverse drug events. This very same bias has driven many hospitals to measure what is easiest to collect, i.e. voluntarily reported medication errors. Indeed recent studies have reported improved medication safety based solely on reductions in voluntary reported medication errors, a very problematic conclusion [16] .
Ultimately, creating a safe medication system will require the use of surveillance approaches to detect ADEs (the accountability focus), the use of both surveillance and voluntary reporting to track medication errors (the learning focus), and a real-time system to allow for rapid detection and prevention of these problems (the intervention focus) [16] .
This approach is impracticable in a paper-based system of care, but quite feasible in an electronic world. Electronic measurement should be utilized to the maximum extent possible because it is a much more cost-effective and comprehensive view of both problems and progress. This is not to say that voluntary reporting and chart review are ever totally replaced, but rather complemented and supplemented by electronic analysis. In fact, many situations picked up in automated surveillance must be considered potential ADEs until they have been investigated, documented, and analyzed, often involving chart review.
How best to leverage electronic data as part of the hospital's patient safety program should be reconsidered each time the scope of the data available for screening is enhanced. When new error situations are uncovered via voluntary reporting, electronic analysis can be useful in checking for other unreported occurrences and similar clinical situations. These systems can help with investigation, detection, identiWcation, mitigation, and amelioration of medication-related problems. 
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